The fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC-5), convened in Busan, South Korea from 25 November to 1 December 2024, closed without a final treaty text after a fractious final plenary session exposed irreconcilable differences between high-ambition and petrochemical-aligned blocs.
The core dispute remained unchanged from earlier negotiating rounds: whether a legally binding global treaty should include caps on virgin plastic production, as championed by the European Union, Norway, and the 44-nation High Ambition Coalition to End Plastic Pollution, or should confine itself to improving downstream waste management, the position advanced by Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, and several Gulf states.
Delegates from Pacific Island nations were among the most vocal advocates for upstream controls. Samoa's lead negotiator characterised the refusal to discuss production caps as a defence of the industry's profit model dressed up as procedural caution. The bloc argued that any treaty focused exclusively on waste would merely redistribute plastic pollution rather than reduce it.
The chair's proposed compromise text, which included bracketed language on production reductions allowing nations to register reservations, was rejected by the petrochemical-aligned bloc as prejudging an outcome that required explicit consensus. The session ended with no agreed text and a mandate for a resumed fifth session, designated INC-5.2, to be convened in the first half of 2025 at a location to be determined by the UNEA secretariat.
For the plastic credits market, the failure to finalise a treaty creates a period of deliberate ambiguity. The draft text circulated at INC-5 contained provisions in Articles 11 and 12 that would have required parties to develop national targets for post-consumer plastic waste collection and recycling, the precise activities that plastic credit projects are designed to incentivise. Had those provisions passed, they would have created both a compliance floor and a potential offset mechanism for nations unable to meet domestic targets through public investment alone.
Industry groups including the American Chemistry Council and PlasticsEurope welcomed the extended timeline, calling for a science-based, voluntary-led approach focused on infrastructure gaps in developing nations rather than restrictions on production. The Global Plastic Action Partnership, which convenes business participants, said it remained committed to engaging in INC-5.2.
NGOs reacted with anger. The Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives (GAIA) accused oil-producing states of procedural sabotage, while Break Free From Plastic described the outcome as a betrayal of frontline communities. Inger Andersen, executive director of the United Nations Environment Programme, urged parties to arrive at INC-5.2 with flexibility and a genuine mandate to conclude.
For corporate buyers of plastic credits, the practical implication is clear: treaty-derived compliance demand is deferred, not cancelled. Companies that have committed to plastic neutrality targets, or that face pressure from the EU Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation, should not treat the Busan impasse as grounds for delay. The voluntary market remains the only available mechanism to offset residual plastic footprints, and demand for verified credits from ocean-bound and post-consumer collection projects is expected to intensify regardless of the treaty timeline.